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Gestures are often considered to be demonstrative of the embodied nature of the mind
(Hostetter and Alibali, 2008). In this article, we review current theories and research
targeted at the intra-cognitive role of gestures. We ask the question how can gestures
support internal cognitive processes of the gesturer? We suggest that extant theories
are in a sense disembodied, because they focus solely on embodiment in terms of
the sensorimotor neural precursors of gestures. As a result, current theories on the
intra-cognitive role of gestures are lacking in explanatory scope to address how gestures-asbodily-acts fulﬁll a cognitive function. On the basis of recent theoretical appeals that focus
on the possibly embedded/extended cognitive role of gestures (Clark, 2013), we suggest
that gestures are external physical tools of the cognitive system that replace and support
otherwise solely internal cognitive processes.That is gestures provide the cognitive system
with a stable external physical and visual presence that can provide means to think with.
We show that there is a considerable amount of overlap between the way the human
cognitive system has been found to use its environment, and how gestures are used
during cognitive processes. Lastly, we provide several suggestions of how to investigate
the embedded/extended perspective of the cognitive function of gestures.
Keywords: gestures, embodied cognition, embedded cognition, extended cognition

INTRODUCTION
Gestures reﬂect internal cognitive processes. This is arguably the
most fundamental, uncontroversial, and straightforward assumption in the current literature concerning gesticulation. Gestures
provide a “window on the mind” (Goldin-Meadow, 2003), which
provides a peek into the “embodied nature of the mind” (Hostetter and Alibali, 2008). In less metaphorical terms, it is argued
that gestures are direct outcomes of multimodal, sensorimotor or
embodied representations that constitute thought processes and
speech production. Although not all theoretical perspectives on
the function and underpinnings of gestures suggest a purely sensorimotor based approach to mental representations (see Krauss,
1998; Kita, 2000 for alternative views), it is commonly held that
activation of the motor-system supports speech production and
thought, at least when the conceptual content is visuospatial in
nature (Alibali, 2005). Several perspectives on gesticulation (e.g.,
McNeill, 1992; Kita, 2000; Wesp et al., 2001) have abandoned
the view that gestures are merely communicative tools that are
elicited after central cognitive processes (e.g., lexical retrieval,
conceptualization) have taken place (Graham and Argyle, 1975;
Kendon, 1994). Instead, in these perspectives the motor-system
has been upgraded from a mere output system to a constitutive
system for (some of the) central processes underlying thought and
speech production. This resonates well with a wider movement in
embodied cognitive science (Wilson, 2002; Shapiro, 2010) in which
mental representations are thought to be multimodal (Barsalou,
1999, 2008; Svensson, 2007) and coupled to the body’s current
state (Glenberg and Kaschak, 2002).
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In this article, we focus on the possible intra-cognitive function
of gestures, as opposed to their inter-cognitive or communicative
function, which we will touch upon only brieﬂy. That is, gestures
seem to support internal cognitive processes of the gesturer (e.g.,
Rauscher et al., 1996; Goldin-Meadow et al., 2001; Morsella and
Krauss, 2004; Marstaller and Burianová, 2013). We argue that the
current theoretical “embodied” movement in gesture research has
fueled the upsurge of inquiry into the beneﬁcial role of gestures in
cognitive processes such as speech and visuospatial cognition, but
that this line of thought is underspeciﬁed with regard to explaining how gestures as bodily movements aid cognitive processing.
In a sense, current perspectives on gestures are still disembodied
and too internalistic because they seem to implicitly reduce gestures to cognitively trivial bodily outputs of (sensorimotor) neural
precursors.
We seek to provide a more embodied account of gesticulation
on the basis of recent philosophical and theoretical appeals within
embodied cognitive science (e.g., Wilson, 2002) that focus on the
possibly embedded/extended role of gestures (Kirsh, 1995; Clark,
2008, 2013; Wheeler, 2013), and a review of related empirical literature (e.g., Gray and Fu, 2004; Kirsh, 2009). This account is “more
embodied” because embedded/extended perspectives traditionally seek to provide an anti-internalist perspective on cognition
(e.g., Hutchins, 1995a), in which cognition is understood as being
on-line, that is, being tightly coupled with, embedded in, if not
extended over, the body and the environment (Shapiro, 2010).
This stands in stark contrast with more internalist notions of
embodiment that are currently dominating the gesture literature
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and that focus on decoupled, or “off-line” cognition and the sensorimotor nature of mental representations (Wilson, 2002). We
suggest that the embedded/extended account of the cognitive function of gestures could be successful in explaining how gestures
fulﬁll a cognitive function if it makes clear how gestures as selfgenerated bodily acts generate and support rather than execute
thought processes (Clark, 2013). Therefore, we focus on the idea
that gestures may at times serve as external tools of the cognitive
system that replace and support otherwise solely internal cognitive
processes. By reviewing research on the beneﬁcial role of gesture
production in (visuo-spatial) cognition (e.g., Chu and Kita, 2008;
Delgado et al., 2011) and connecting the resulting insights with
research on embedded cognition (e.g., Kirsh and Maglio, 1994;
Hutchins, 1995a; Gray and Fu, 2004) we aim to contribute to a
more embedded/extended account of gestures.
Before we will elaborate on the main goals of this paper, we
need to point out what this article is not about. First, we do
not suggest that current perspectives in the gesture literature are
incorrect. In fact, our embedded/extended perspective is largely
complementary to, and in some instances builds on, contemporary accounts of the function of gestures we review here. Second,
although we argue in favor of a more embodied account of gestures
and their cognitive function, this does not require us to make any
additional, more radical, claims about the supposed sensorimotor
nature of conceptual representations that are currently under discussion in the literature (e.g., Dove, 2010; Arbib et al., 2014; Zwaan,
in press). Third, we will not provide philosophical claims about
whether gestures should be considered as an extended as opposed
to an embedded cognitive phenomenon (e.g., Adams and Aizawa,
2001; Clark, 2008, 2013; Wheeler, 2013). That is, we do not make
explicit claims about whether gestures as extra-neural events are
part of the cognitive process (extended claim) or whether gestures
merely support internal cognitive processes but strictly speaking
should not be considered as part of the cognitive process (embedded claim). Rather, we aim to provide an empirical view through
the embedded/extended perspective, on the basis of the shared
anti-internalist goal of these perspectives, by focusing on extraneural factors that support, shape, and replace internal cognitive
processes. We suggest that our embedded/extended account of the
cognitive function of gestures can ﬁll an explanatory gap in the
current literature concerning the possible intra-cognitive role of
gestures and is supported by extant ﬁndings.
This article is structured into four main sections. The next
section reviews ﬁndings that show that co-speech and -thought
gestures have a (beneﬁcial) cognitive function (primarily in visuospatial cognition). Section three provides an overview of some
important theoretical perspectives on the role of gestures in cognition. We suggest that the current theoretical perspectives on
the function and underpinnings of gestures leave an explanatory gap concerning how gestures as external bodily acts might
be conducive to internal cognitive processes. Having exposed the
explanatory gap, we introduce an embedded/extended account of
gestures (Clark, 2008, 2013) and provide a new interpretation of
the research reviewed in the previous section in light of recent
research in the ﬁeld of embedded cognition (Kirsh and Maglio,
1994; Ballard et al., 1995; Gray and Fu, 2004; Kirsh, 2009; Risko
et al., 2013). Finally, we summarize and discuss our main points.
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THE FUNCTION OF GESTURE: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
THE INTER-COGNITIVE ROLE OF GESTURES

Before we consider evidence for the beneﬁcial or supportive role
of gestures for cognitive processes, it is important to acknowledge the evidence for the common assertion that gestures fulﬁll
a communicative function. When speakers produce gestures, this
seems to be intended to increase listeners’ understanding of their
message. Indeed, when speaker and listener are face-to-face, more
gestures with semantic content are produced than when there is
no visual contact (Alibali et al., 2001). Also, when speakers are
aware of listeners’ knowledge gaps, they tend to convey the information unknown to listeners in both speech and gesture, while
they tend to only use verbal information when relevant knowledge
is already shared between the interlocutors (Holler and Stevens,
2007). These results suggest that speakers adjust their gestures for
their listeners’ beneﬁt. And indeed, listeners’ comprehension has
been shown to improve by speakers’ use of gestures from an early
age on. For example, 3- to 5-year-olds understand indirect requests
(Kelly, 2001) and new abstract concepts (Valenzeno et al., 2003)
better when the request is accompanied by deictic (i.e., pointing)
gestures. In addition, preschoolers understand complex spoken
messages better when these are accompanied by representational
gestures (McNeil et al., 2000). Moreover, co-speech gestures do not
only contribute to what is understood, but also to how something
is understood. When deictic gestures are used, listeners are more
likely to correctly interpret utterances compared to when the utterance was not combined with a gesture, suggesting that co-speech
gestures play a role in pragmatic understanding. For example,
when hearing the utterance “it’s getting hot in here,” people were
sooner inclined to interpret this as an indirect request (i.e., could
you please open the window) when the speaker pointed to the
window, than when the speaker did not point, in which case the
listener might interpret the utterance as a mere statement (Kelly
et al., 1999). All in all, there is a great deal of evidence for the contention that gestures fulﬁll inter-cognitive (i.e., communicative)
functions (Goldin-Meadow and Alibali, 2012).
THE INTRA-COGNITIVE ROLE OF GESTURES

There is mounting evidence that gestures fulﬁll intra-cognitive
functions in addition to inter-cognitive ones. This is relevant
to our present purposes. For example, co-speech gestures affect
speakers’ own cognitive processes. Several studies have suggested
that lexical access is disrupted or promoted when gesticulation
is prohibited vs. allowed to naturally emerge. When speakers
are prohibited from gesturing during speech with spatial content, they are less ﬂuent than when gesticulation is allowed,
suggesting that lexical access is disrupted (Rauscher et al., 1996;
Morsella and Krauss, 2004; see, however, Hoetjes et al., 2014).
Moreover, speech is more ﬂuent when co-speech gestures are
produced and gesture rates are higher when lexical access is difﬁcult (e.g., during the tip of the tongue phenomenon; Chawla
and Krauss, 1994). Furthermore, when gesticulation is prohibited, the content of speech is less likely to be spatial in nature,
suggesting that gestures support speech that is spatial in content
(Rimé et al., 1984). Not only can online speech be inﬂuenced
by co-speech gestures, these gestures can also have an inﬂuence
off-line. For example, making gestures during the recollection of
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a previous event, can improve retrieval of details of that event
compared to when gesticulation is not allowed (Stevanoni and
Salmon, 2005). In addition, gesticulation prior to recalling previously learned words aids recall performance (De Nooijer et al.,
2013).
Gestures primarily arise during the processing of visuospatial information (e.g., Alibali et al., 2001; Seyfeddinipur and Kita,
2001; Allen, 2003; Kita and Özyürek, 2003). For example, people are more likely to gesture when describing visual objects
from memory as opposed to when the object is visually present
(Wesp et al., 2001; Morsella and Krauss, 2004; see also Ping and
Goldin-Meadow, 2010), although gesticulation also occurs when
the object is present (Morsella and Krauss, 2004). Moreover, gestures occur more often when objects are difﬁcult to describe in
speech, such as complex, not easily describable drawings (Morsella
and Krauss, 2004). Indeed, the emergence of gesticulation appears
to be related to the cognitive demands of the task (Goldin-Meadow
et al., 2001; Wagner et al., 2004; Ping and Goldin-Meadow, 2010;
Cook et al., 2012; Marstaller and Burianová, 2013; Smithson and
Nicoladis, 2014). For example, participants who were given the
dual task of remembering letters while explaining a difﬁcult math
problem, remembered more letters when they were allowed to
gesture while explaining the problem than when they were not
allowed to gesture (Goldin-Meadow et al., 2001). This suggests
that gesticulation reduced the working memory load imposed
by explaining the math problem, leaving more capacity available
for performing the secondary task of remembering letters. Gesticulation when describing a mental rotation problem emerges
primarily when describing the task-relevant rotation itself as
opposed to describing the task-relevant static end-point of the
rotation (Hostetter et al., 2011). This ﬁnding suggests that it is
the high spatial cognitive demand, which is arguably higher during dynamic spatio-temporal rotation as opposed to describing
static spatial information, that invokes the use of gestures (see also
Smithson and Nicoladis, 2014). Furthermore, it has been found
that encouraging participants to gesture during a mental rotation
task enhances their performance (Chu and Kita, 2011).
The ﬁndings described here primarily involved iconic gestures.
However, even deictic (pointing) gestures occur more often when
cognitive demand is higher. Infants and young children (between
1 and 2 years of age) sometimes point for non-communicative
reasons (Bates et al., 1975; Delgado et al., 2009). Furthermore,
pointing gestures can aid the regulation of the speaker’s attention
in non-communicative and challenging problem-solving situations (Delgado et al., 2011). In two studies, children ranging in age
from 2 to 4 years old saw a toy being hidden in one of three containers on a rotation table. This was followed by a delay of 45–60 s
during which the children either had to remember where the toy
was hidden by the experimenter (cognitive demand group) or had
to wait for the experimenter to retrieve the toy for them. During the
delay the experimenter left the room. Additionally, the difﬁculty of
the memory task was varied for half of the trials such that the table
was turned for 540◦ . Analysis of the video-taped sessions showed
not only that solitary pointing gestures occurred, but also that they
occurred signiﬁcantly more often in the cognitive demand condition than in the waiting condition (although no effects were found
for task difﬁculty). A second experiment with children ranging
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from 4 to 6 years old who performed a picture-matching task
showed that constraining gestures resulted in poorer performance
on the task than non-constraining gestures, but only for children
who habitually pointed in the constrained condition, suggesting
a cognitively beneﬁcial role of solitary pointing gestures. This
ﬁnding is surprising because deictic gestures have primarily been
considered as serving communicative functions (Tomasello et al.,
2007). Additional research on pointing gestures was conducted
in the context of keeping track of counting. Children, adults,
and even primates effectively use the hands in counting objects
by pointing and touching gestures as to mark counted objects,
and synchronize with counting expressed in speech (Boysen et al.,
1995; Kirsh, 1995; Alibali and DiRusso, 1999). For example, participants who were allowed to use their hands for pointing during
the counting of coins were faster and made fewer mistakes than
those who were not allowed to use their hands (Kirsh, 1995).
Thus, pointing gestures sometimes regulate visuo-spatial attentional processes, being especially helpful under high cognitive task
demands.
These results converge with a recent correlational study that
examined whether individual differences in spatial working memory capacity, spatial transformation ability, and conceptualization
ability (amongst others) were associated with frequency of use of
several types of gestures (Chu et al., 2013). Lower scores on all of
these variables predicted higher frequency of spontaneously produced representational and conduit1 gestures in a natural setting.
Other evidence is consistent with this pattern. Particularly people with low working memory capacity are negatively impacted
on a working memory task when they are not allowed to gesture as opposed to people with high working memory capacity
(Marstaller and Burianová, 2013). Thus, in addition to the ﬁndings that gestures emerge during spatial information processing,
gestures are also more likely to be produced by, and more likely
to affect cognitive processes of, people with low spatial working
memory and information processing ability (see also Chu and
Kita, 2011).
Further evidence for gesturing as a compensatory mechanism
comes from a study by Chu and Kita (2008). The type of spontaneous gestures that participants used during a mental rotation
task followed a trajectory from external to more internalized solution strategies. That is, participants ﬁrst gestured concretely as if
manipulating the object to be rotated and subsequently changed
their strategy and used their ﬂat hand as stand-in for the object
that needed to be rotated. Moreover, frequency of gesture use
in aiding a spatial rotation task diminished over time, suggesting that cognitive operations became gradually internalized. A
related phenomenon is that intermediate advanced abacus users
use gestures during mental calculation. In the absence of the
abacus, trained participants apply ﬁnger gestures as if manipulating an abacus ready to hand; but as abacus users become
more advanced, they exhibit a reduced reliance on gestures during mental calculation (Hatano et al., 1977; Hatano and Osawa,
1983). In line with the ﬁndings of Chu and Kita (2008) this shows
that the use of gestures becomes more infrequent as familiarity
1 Deﬁned as “iconic depictions of abstract concepts of meaning and language”
(McNeill, 1985, p. 357).

April 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 359 | 3

Pouw et al.

with the task increases. Moreover, when describing the solution
of a particular spatial problem, people’s gesticulation aligns with
the medium that the problem has been introduced in Cook and
Tanenhaus (2009). For example, participants who described solutions of the Tower of Hanoi with physical disks as opposed to a
computer simulation tended to spontaneously produce gestures
that aligned with the physical actions performed with physical
disks.
Thus, if we consider (a) that working memory capacity is limited, and (b) that new tasks often impose a higher working memory
demand that diminishes as the learner becomes more experienced
with a task (e.g., Chase and Ericsson, 1982; Kalyuga et al., 2003)
then the ﬁndings we just reviewed suggest that gestures are likely to
emerge in novel situations so as to provide the cognizer with some
kind of external support. We will discuss the nature of this external support in our embedded/extended account of the cognitive
function of gestures.
Finally, gestures can aid in acquiring a solution during problem solving (Alibali et al., 2004; Stephen et al., 2009; Boncoddo
et al., 2010). For example, participants were presented with two
glasses with differing widths and equal heights and were asked
to imagine the glasses being ﬁlled with water to the same level.
Participants judged whether the water would spill when glasses
were rotated at equal angles (Schwartz and Black, 1999). Participants were able to predict the answer correctly much more
often when rotating the empty glasses with their eyes closed,
compared to when they were only allowed to think about the solution (i.e., mentally rotate). Although the previous study was in
a sense a form of direct action (by allowing the objects to be
manipulated), there is evidence that suggests that gestures, as
non-direct manipulations, equally support the use of particular
problem-solving strategies. For example, a study in which participants were presented with an interlocking gear problem (Alibali
et al., 2004) found that they judged the direction of movement
of a gear through different strategies, depending on whether or
not gesticulation was allowed. When they were allowed to gesture, participants were more likely to simulate the rotations of
each gear by ﬁnger gestures in order to provide the solution of
the end-gear’s rotational direction (depictive strategy), whereas
participants who were prohibited from gesticulation were more
likely to achieve the solution through the parity rule (direction
gear x has the same direction as gear x + 2). Note that the
participants who used the depictive strategy were not better at
the task than those using the parity rule (Alibali et al., 2004;
also see Hegarty et al., 2005). Indeed, the parity rule strategy
is generally considered to be the most effective strategy (Boncoddo et al., 2010). It is interesting in this regard to note that
preschoolers are more likely to achieve understanding of the
parity rule through gesticulation (Boncoddo et al., 2010). That
is, preschoolers who used more gestures supporting a depictive
strategy, more efﬁciently acquired a strategy based on the parity
principle, in comparison to preschoolers who gestured less. Thus
in this particular instance, the repeated use of gestures by participants is more likely to lead to discovery of new strategies during
problem-solving although the use of gestures does not necessarily invite learners to adopt the most efﬁcient strategy (see also
Stephen et al., 2009).
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The research reviewed here provides evidence that gestures have
an intra-cognitive cognitive function for the gesturer. Furthermore, it produces two intriguing and related questions that we
think need to be answered in a theoretical account of the cognitive
function of gesticulation. First, why do gestures occur more often
when cognitive demand is high? Second, why are spatial cognitive
ability and working-memory capacity negatively related to the use
of gestures?

CURRENT THEORY ABOUT THE ORIGIN AND FUNCTION OF
GESTURE
In this section, we will discuss several prominent accounts that
aim to elucidate the underlying mechanisms and function of gestures, most prominently the Gesture-as-Simulated-Action account
(GSA; Hostetter and Alibali, 2008) and subsequently the Lexical
Gesture Process (LGP) model (Krauss et al., 2000), the Information Packaging Hypothesis (IPH; Kita, 2000), and the Image
Maintenance Theory (IMT; Wesp et al., 2001). We evaluate these
models directly after summarizing their main points, by assessing their explanatory power regarding the question: how do
gestures-as-bodily-acts support cognitive processes?
We have chosen to address this collection of accounts for several
reasons. The GSA account is a prominent contemporary account
that attempts to integrate the literature of embodied cognition and
the literature on gesture into a single perspective. Yet, as mentioned
in the introduction, it seems that this attempt has resulted in a“disembodied” perspective on gesticulation. The other accounts have
been very inﬂuential in elucidating the cognitive function of gestures. Moreover, they differ signiﬁcantly from the GSA account but
also from each other. The result is a representative (but not exhaustive) overview of theories about the possible cognitive function of
gestures.
GESTURE-AS-SIMULATED-ACTION ACCOUNT

The GSA account (Hostetter and Alibali, 2008) relies heavily on
the insights from embodied cognition that representations are
based on the sensorimotor system (Barsalou, 1999, 2008; Glenberg and Kaschak, 2002). This embodied view is supported by
mounting evidence that perceptuo-motor faculties of the brain
are activated during concrete but also supposedly symbolic and
abstract conceptual processes (e.g., Barsalou, 2008; Pulvermüller
et al., 2014). For example, merely reading words that have olfactory, gustatory, or motor connotations (e.g., garlic, jasmine, salt,
sour, kick, pick) as opposed to reading neutral words, activates
brain regions that are involved in smelling, tasting, and moving
(Hauk et al., 2004; Gonzalez et al., 2006; Barrós-Loscertales et al.,
2012).
The GSA approach predicts that cognitive processes, such
as conceptual processing, co-occur with sensorimotor reactivations. More importantly it is contended that meaningful
cognitive processing is dependent on these reactivations or simulations of sensorimotor states (Barsalou, 2008; Hostetter and
Alibali, 2008). Indeed, conceptual processing is hampered when
participants are primed with inconsistent perceptual or motor
information (e.g., Glenberg et al., 2005; Kaschak et al., 2006).
For example, participants are quicker in verifying the sensibility of sentences (such as “Andy delivered the pizza to you
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vs. you delivered the pizza to Andy”) when their response
actions were consistent with the implied motion of the sentences (moving the hand forward or backward), whereas they
were slower when the movement contrasted with the implied
motion (Glenberg and Kaschak, 2002). As such, it is suggested
that induced sensorimotor states impinge on conceptual representational states since both systems are tightly coupled (Barsalou,
2008).
Hostetter and Alibali (2008) have suggested that the phenomenon of co-speech and co-thought gestures ﬁts nicely with the
idea that cognitive processing depends on activations in the sensorimotor system. In fact, according to the GSA account gestures are
the bodily realizations (or as they call it, “visible embodiments”)
of otherwise covert sensorimotor activations. The main question
that the GSA account aims to address, therefore, is how sensorimotor activations come to be reﬂected in gestures. Hostetter and
Alibali (2008, p. 503) ﬁrst provide a simple answer: “Simulation
involves premotor action states; this activation has the potential to
spread to motor areas and to be realized as overt action. When this
spreading activation occurs, a gesture is born.” More speciﬁcally,
the GSA account suggests that gestures emerge through sensorimotor re-activations underlying thought and speech processing
that “leak into” the motor-executive system:
“As an analogy, we might imagine activation spreading from premotor areas to motor areas through a gate. Once the gate is opened to
allow more activation for one task (speaking), it may be difﬁcult to
inhibit other premotor activation (that which supports gestures) from
also spreading through the gate to motor areas, the activation for the
simulations ‘rides along’ and may be manifested as a gesture” (Hostetter
and Alibali, 2008, p. 505).

Hostetter and Alibali (2008) further propose three underlying
factors that determine when gestures are likely to occur. First, the
strength of the particular perceptuo-motor activation must surpass a certain gesture threshold for actual physical embodiment
(i.e., gesticulation) to arise. This activation strength is dependent
on the degree to which speakers evoke visuospatial imagery during
conceptual processing. For instance, they argue that the same conceptual content can be processed verbal-propositionally or with
visuo-spatial imagery (e.g., in the case of route-descriptions), the
latter type of encoding being more likely to evoke gesticulation
(e.g., Alibali et al., 2001; Seyfeddinipur and Kita, 2001; Allen,
2003; Kita and Özyürek, 2003). Second, visuo-motor simulations are likely to evoke gesticulation when the conceptual content
that is being processed involves an action. For example, talking
about action is likely to evoke gestures because it is dependent
on motor-information (Hostetter and Alibali, 2008). Third, it is
speculated that the height of speakers’ gesture-threshold can vary
across individuals and situations. To illustrate, a higher degree
of neural interconnectivity between pre-motor and motor areas
may lower the gesture threshold of a particular individual. Furthermore, inhibiting gesticulation requires cognitive effort and as
such the threshold might be lowered when cognitive load is high
(e.g., Goldin-Meadow et al., 2001).
Explanatory power of the GSA account

So how does the GSA account answer our question of how
gestures-as-bodily-acts support cognitive processes? First, it is
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held that speech production and thought processes are dependent
on the conceptual system recruiting sensorimotor representations.
Furthermore, according to Hostetter and Alibali (2008), gestures
arise from and are dependent on the strength of sensorimotor
activations. However, the model does not allow the conclusion
that gestures-as-bodily-acts aid cognition, because gestures only
execute sensorimotor information, they do not produce it. The
sensorimotor information that is produced (e.g., proprioceptive
and visual consequences of movement) does not fulﬁll a cognitive function in the GSA account. This is indicated by the
motor-leakage metaphor, as gestures simply “ride along” with sensorimotor activations (Hostetter and Alibali, 2008, p. 505) and
can be understood as a mere “outgrowth” (Risko et al., 2013) or
“visible embodiments” (Hostetter and Alibali, 2008) of internal
embodied simulations. Thus, the GSA account leaves us with the
question why do cognitive processes sometimes recruit the body
(gestures), as opposed to relying on purely internal mechanisms?
Furthermore, what is the explanatory power of the GSA account
in terms of the empirical literature on the cognitive function of
gestures provided above? Most notably, why is high cognitive
demand result in more use of gestures. This is explained by the
GSA account in “that inhibiting activation from spreading to a
gesture requires more cognitive resources than does producing
the gesture” (Hostetter and Alibali, 2008, p. 505). From this point
of view, gesticulation is the default and is simply hard-wired with
cognitive processes. By accepting this, we would simply deﬂate the
idea of there being any function of gestures as bodily acts, endow
the cognitive system with functionally unnecessary expenditure
of energy (hand-movements), and allow only a negative cognitive
effect of not gesturing. Although this idea of costly active inhibition may very well be a correct explanation for some instances
of gesticulation, we think its possible scope for explaining the
function of gesture is somewhat reduced by the realization that
possessing a superﬂuous and energy-demanding gesture system
does not seem very adaptive or ﬂexible. Moreover, we think that
a non-deﬂationary account of the function of gesture is possible and in fact more promising for understanding the empirical
ﬁndings on the cognitive function of gestures reviewed in this
paper.
LEXICAL GESTURE PROCESS MODEL

The LGP model proposed by Krauss et al. (2000) tries to explain
why speech might be facilitated by gesticulation. According to
this theory, gestures do not only fulﬁll a communicative role,
but may serve to facilitate lexical retrieval on the part of the
gesturer as well. Gestures that share features with the lexical
semantic content of the word will facilitate lexical access. Krauss
et al. (2000) hypothesize that this is the case because gesturing
results in “cross-modal priming” in which features of the concept
represented by the gesture can facilitate lexical retrieval. According to this LGP account, gesture production draws upon the
activated representations in working memory that are expressed
in speech. The assumption is that the content of conceptual
memory is encoded in multiple ways, and that activation of
one representational format can spread to activation in another
representational format. In this account, gestures derive from nonpropositional representational formats (mostly visuo-spatial), as
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opposed to speech, which draws on propositional symbolic formats. LGP further suggests that non-propositional information
becomes expressed in speech through a spatial/dynamic feature
selector that transforms spatially and dynamically formatted information into a set of “abstract properties of movement.” The
abstract speciﬁcations are then translated into a motor program
by a motor planner. Motor systems output the set of instructions
from the motor planner and the gestural movement is monitored
kinesthetically. The motoric features that are picked up by the
kinesthetic monitor promote retrieval of the concept for speech
through cross-modal priming. Krauss and Hadar (1999, p. 21)
specify:
“The spatio-dynamic information the gesture encodes is fed via the
kinesic monitor to the formulator, where it facilitates lexical retrieval.
Facilitation is achieved through cross-modal priming, in which gesturally represented features of the concept in memory participate in
lexical retrieval. Of course, it is possible to locate the site of gestural
input more precisely (e.g., the grammatical encoder or the phonological
encoder).”

Explanatory power Lexical Gesture Process model

Does LGP allow for a cognitive role of gestures-as-bodily-acts?
That is, does it answer the question why gestures are produced,
and how they are cognitively relevant? An afﬁrmative response
is appropriate, although the mechanism seems underspeciﬁed
and unparsimonious. Indeed, when a gesture is outputted by the
motor-system, the “kinesthetic” feedback that is produced acts
as input to the formulator (i.e., the grammatical or phonological encoder or both) and can then facilitate lexical selection by
way of additional cues or “cross-modal priming.” Thus, in this
model, motor-information is externalized and is fed back into
the system to promote lexical retrieval through supporting the
processes of the “grammatical encoder” and the “phonological
encoder.” Yet the question remains why this motor-information
needs to loop out of the brain and then be retrieved again by the
kinesthetic monitor. According to LGP, gesture will only facilitate lexical access when the gesture features match the lexical
semantic content of the concept. Therefore, gestures will only
facilitate lexical access when the kinesthetic information that was
already present in a verbal form is fed back into the formulator. Thus it seems that the brain is “primed” with information
that is already present in the internal system, given that gestures
are outputs of an already constructed motor program. Thus, it
is unclear with what kind of information the cognitive system
is primed. Of course, gestures might indeed fulﬁll this function,
but the model currently presented is not very illuminating why
and how gestures-as-bodily-acts fulﬁll a cognitive function. So,
although LGP also suggests an intra-cognitive role for gestures, it is
still difﬁcult to appreciate the added value of the kinesthetic information that is fed back into the system with regard to cognitive
processing.
INFORMATION PACKAGING HYPOTHESIS

A third prominent theory in the gesture literature is the IPH
(Kita, 2000). This theory proposes that gestures aid speech production by breaking images into smaller bits to enhance the
verbalize-ability of communicative content. A key idea is that
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there are two modes of thinking that tend to converge during the linguistic act. There is analytical thinking as opposed
to spatio-motoric thinking from which gestures follow, which
involves the organization of information through hierarchical
structuring and involves decontextualized conceptual templates.
According to Kita, these templates can be non-linguistic (in the
case of scripts), or linguistic, such as in the case of a lexical item’s semantic and pragmatic speciﬁcations. The templates
are not multimodal as in the case of the GSA account, thus
they do not involve “activation of ‘peripheral’ modules” (Kita,
2000, p. 164), yet can be translated into the other mode of
thinking, which is spatio-motoric thinking. The spatio-motoric
mode of thinking constitutes gestures and involves information
organized in action schemas. Gestures should be considered as
actions in a virtual environment, and are derived from practical
actions.
A core idea behind IPH is that the two modes of thinking collaboratively organize information during speaking. Kita (2000,
p. 163) suggests that (a) “The production of the representational
gesture helps speakers organize rich spatiotemporal information”,
(b) “Spatio-motoric thinking, which underlies representational
gestures helps speaking by providing an alternative informational
organization that is not readily accessible to analytic thinking”
and (c) “Spatio-motoric thinking and analytic thinking have ready
access to different sets of informational organizations. However,
in the course of speech production, the representations in the two
modes of thinking are coordinated and tend to converge.”
Explanatory power Information Packaging Hypothesis

Does IPH have explanatory power of how gestures-as-bodily-acts
support cognitive processes? The IPH does not provide a clear
account of how gestures aid the “packaging of information” given
that gestures are considered as the result of spatio-motoric thinking that is already internally realized. That is, just like the GSA, the
IPH seems to regard gestures as mere output of spatio-motoric
thinking, with the latter having the actual cognitive function
(information packaging). Even if we allow for a possible different
reading of the IPH, in which gesticulation actually supports spatiomotoric thinking, the IPH account does not go into any detail
about how gestures-as-bodily-acts feedback to or support internal cognitive processes to perform the function of spatio-motoric
information packaging.
IMAGE MAINTENANCE THEORY

The ﬁnal theory under review here is the IMT by Wesp et al. (2001).
Although this theory is only brieﬂy presented in an empirical paper
it has become an inﬂuential view on the cognitive role of gestures
(Alibali, 2005). Arguably, the main thesis of the IMT, which is often
contrasted with the LGP, is “that gestures are not directly involved
in the search for words; rather, they keep the non-lexical concept
in memory during the lexical search, a process of data maintenance not unlike that needed in other problem-solving activities”
(Wesp et al., 2001, p. 592). This is further explained; “a prelinguistic representation of spatial information is established through
spatial imagery and maintenance of these spatial images is facilitated by gestures” (Wesp et al., 2001, p. 595). Wesp et al. (2001)
base this idea on the idea that spatial information is held in the
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visuospatial scratchpad of working memory (Baddeley, 2003). The
items (visuospatial information) in the scratchpad decay rapidly
and must be rehearsed to be maintained in working memory. Just
like articulatory loops, gestures serve the function of “refreshing”
the visual scratchpad to sustain activation of the image in working memory. Importantly, gestures are therefore not necessary for
lexical retrieval but may indirectly facilitate it through, “motoric
refreshing” of the image (p. 597).

(explanandum), namely how gestures-as-bodily-actions have a
cognitive function. This means that we do not suggest that the theories under discussion are wrong, nor do we suggest that they are
incompatible with the upcoming perspective; rather the explanantia they offer are not (yet) suitable to cover the explanandum that is
the focus of the current paper. In the next section, we aim to ﬁll this
explanatory gap through a more embedded/extended perspective
on the cognitive function on gestures.

Explanatory power Image Maintenance Theory

TOWARD A MORE EMBEDDED/EXTENDED PERSPECTIVE TO
THE COGNITIVE FUNCTION OF GESTURES
In this section, we attempt to answer the main question of how
gestures can fulﬁll cognitive functions. In the following subsection, we will brieﬂy introduce the embedded/extended cognition
perspective (inspired by Clark, 2013), which is followed by a representative overview of research in this domain. Subsequently we
apply the relevant theoretical and empirical ﬁndings to the cognitive function of gestures, which yields challenges and hypotheses
for future research.

Does the IMT have explanatory power of how gestures-as-bodilyacts, support cognitive processes? The answer is yes, although
much is still needed to understand its function. “Yes” because
the IMT suggests that the production of a physical gesture supports the maintenance of an internal spatial image (a cognitive
process); without the physical gesture the internal spatial image
becomes unstable and its activation is likely to decay. Yet, Wesp
et al.’s (2001) account does not provide sufﬁcient detail beyond
this notion. How do gestures refresh motoric spatial images? What
is the mechanism by which gestures-as-bodily-acts refresh motor
spatial images? Furthermore, are not gestures redundant given
that they provide the gesturer with information that is already
present in the system that outputs the gestures (e.g., visual information)? Although these questions remain unanswered, of all the
accounts presented here, the IMT is most compatible with an
embedded/extended account that assumes gestures are cognitively
relevant because they are bodily.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM THE THEORETICAL OVERVIEW

In the previous subsections, we have discussed four models that
have been put forth to explain the underlying mechanisms of
gestures. We sought an answer to our question: how do gesturesas-bodily-acts support cognitive processes? Our review of the
literature suggests that the cognitive function of gestures-asbodily-acts cannot be adequately explained, or remains underspeciﬁed, in several different theories about the underpinnings
and functions of gestures. In the GSA account gestures are seen as
by-products of sensorimotor activation but cease to be supporting
cognition the moment they are outputted by the motor-system.
The IPH suggests that gestures help package the spatio-motoric
thinking during speech, yet this account also assumes that gestures are the result of these processes as they are the realizations
of spatio-motoric internal processes; they are pre-packaged the
moment they are externalized as gestures and do no packaging of
their own. In the LGP account, the gestures that are produced are
fed back into the cognitive system to provide it with cross-modal
primes. As such, gestures, as physical acts, attain a function. Yet,
the LGP account is unclear about what exactly is primed, or what
novel information gestures provide to the system, that was not
already activated or present. Interestingly, the IMT does seem to
ascribe a deﬁnite cognitive function to gestures by positing that
they support the maintenance of mental images.
It is important to stress that our review is aimed at answering
a speciﬁc question that may be different from the questions that
the theories we discussed were designed to address. We have only
considered these theories’ explanations (explanantia) of a particular aspect of gesticulation that we think needs to be explained
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AN EMBEDDED/EXTENDED PERSPECTIVE: THEORY AND RESEARCH

Embedded/extended cognition is considered part of the broader
development of embodied cognitive science (Wilson, 2002;
Shapiro, 2010) and has its roots (amongst others; Gallagher, 2009)
in situated cognition (Bredo, 1994), robotics (Brooks, 1991) and
the dynamical systems approach to cognition (Chemero, 2009).
According to a loose description of “the” embedded/extended
perspective on cognition (cf. Wilson, 2002), the main thesis is
that the cognitive system is a coupled brain–body–world system
(Wheeler, 2007; Clark, 2008). As such, cognition involves an ongoing transaction between current states of the brain, body, and the
environment (Clark, 2008). Within this view, the classic internalist picture of cognition is disputed; thinking is something
we do, rather than something that simply happens within us.
Understanding cognition, therefore, requires a broader level of
analysis that allows the study of how we use our body and the
world during the unfolding of cognitive processes. For example,
Hutchins (1995b) analyzed the goings-on of commercial airlines
and suggested that a purely internalist perspective was ill-suited
to understand its workings; ﬂying a plane involves task-relevant
information that is neither fully instantiated in the cockpit, the
pilot, or co-pilots, it is rather distributed among them and all
parts work together (see also Hutchins, 1995a). Everyday examples of embedded/extended cognitive phenomena would be, for
instance, asking another person to remind you of something, using
a tall building for navigating your way home, or reducing working
memory load by taking notes during a conversation. Or in the
case of drawing: “One draws, responds to what one has drawn,
draws more, and so on. The goals for the drawing change as the
drawing evolves and different effects become possible, making the
whole development a mutual affair rather than a matter of one-way
determinism” (Bredo, 1994, p. 28).
In philosophy, there is a debate on whether states of the body
and the environment can be considered extra-neural contributors
to cognition (Wilson, 2002), or in a more radical reading, external vehicles of cognition (Clark and Chalmers, 1998; Clark, 2008).
According to the radical extended perspective, the internalist view
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is provoked by the classic thesis that “If, as we confront some
task, a part of the world functions as a process which, were it to
go on in the head, we would have no hesitation in accepting as
part of the cognitive process, then that part of the world is (for
that time) part of the cognitive process” (Clark and Chalmers,
1998, p. 8). The less radical thesis, the notion of embeddedness, also stresses a tight coupling between the agent and the
world and suggests that the body and environment can, often in
unexpected ways, causally impact cognition, yet suggest that the
body and the environment are not part of cognition (Adams and
Aizawa, 2001; Rupert, 2009). Thus the difference between embedded and extended cognition is whether extra-neural conditions
causally impact cognition (embedded thesis) or are constitutive
of it (extended thesis). As mentioned in the introduction, we will
side-step this technical debate; for our present purposes it sufﬁces
to say that we follow the joint anti-internalist approach of embedded and extended cognition, which suggests that the cognitive
system works in concert with the body and the environment.
The embedded/extended perspective has given rise to a large
amount of empirical research on the way the cognitive system
uses the body and the environment (e.g., Kirsh and Maglio, 1994;
Ballard et al., 1995; Haselen et al., 2000; Martin and Schwartz,
2005; Fu, 2011; Risko et al., 2013; see also Pouw et al., 2014). A
seminal study by Kirsh and Maglio (1994; see also Stull et al.,
2012) found that expert Tetris players make more use of epistemic actions; actions that uncover (hidden) information that is
cognitively demanding to compute. These types of actions are
different from actions that bring one closer to one’s goal (pragmatic actions). For example, advanced players, instead of rotating
“zoids” (i.e., falling block arrangements in Tetris) through mental simulation to judge whether it will ﬁt the zoids in the bottom
deck, they preferred rotating them physically as this allowed a
direct matching of orientation and ﬁt. The cognitive operation of
rotation to determine a possible ﬁt was thus off-loaded onto the
environment.
Another classic study (Ballard et al., 1995, 1997; Haselen
et al., 2000) showed that the cognitive system opts for retrieving information just-in-time, thereby minimizing constrains on
working-memory. Participants were asked to recreate a conﬁguration of colored blocks from a model by picking up colored
blocks from a resource space and putting them in a work-space.
The model, resource-, and work-space were all displayed in front
of the participants. Eye-movement data were collected during this
task. Participants made many switches of eye ﬁxations between the
model, work and -resource space. This indicated that participants
adopt a “minimal memory strategy” in which information is gathered incrementally as opposed to memorized in one fell swoop.
Instead of memorizing the position and color all at once, participants ﬁrst memorized the color to be searched from the model,
then after ﬁnding a color match in the resource space, looked up
the position of the block of the model. Thus, information is gathered just in time to minimize working memory constraints (see
also Cary and Carlson, 1999, who obtained similar results in an
income calculation task).
Yet, ﬁndings indicate that the cognitive system does not seem to
have an a priori preference for using the environment rather than
internal cognitive resources in solving a cognitive problem; which
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strategy is adopted depends on the context. For example, when
Ballard et al. (1995) increased the distance between the workplace
and the model, participants were more likely to adopt a memoryintensive strategy. This ﬁnding resonates with the study by Gray
and Fu (2004; see also Fu, 2011) in which participants were confronted with the task of programing a simulated VCR. In this task,
retrieval costs of attaining task-relevant information were subtly
manipulated. That is, the ease of retrieval was manipulated in
such a way that participants could either acquire the information
through a simple glimpse or through performing an additional
mouse-click to make the information available. The cognitive
strategy that the subjects chose changed as a function of the ease of
retrievability. When external information was directly accessible,
participants primarily relied on retrieving information externally.
Attaining this “perfect-knowledge-in-the-world” was shown to be
a reliable strategy, as it reduces the number of mistakes made during the task. Moreover, when the information was only indirectly
available, participants were more likely to rely on internal memory, which produced a larger number of mistakes. The reason why
participants in this condition relied on “imperfect-knowledge-inthe-head” was that the internally stored information was more
quickly available compared to externally available information,
as was predicted by a computational model that expressed the
amount of time it takes to retrieve or recall information. Thus
people seem to opt for the quickest problem-solving strategy in
which the cognitive system “tends to recruit, on the spot, whatever
mix of problem-solving resources will yield an acceptable result
with a minimum of effort” (Clark, 2008, p. 13).
Situational constraints bring about a trade-off decision whether
the cognitive system relies on computation performed “on-line”
(with the environment) or “off-line” (internally; Wilson, 2002).
Relevant in this regard is a recent set of experiments conducted
by Risko et al. (2013) in which participants were presented with
a varying number of letters that were either presented upright
or tilted at 45◦ or 90◦ . Participants spontaneously rotated their
head, which indeed seemed to promote readability of tilted presentation of letters. Furthermore, participants were more likely
to rotate their head when more letters were presented and tilt
of the letters was more extreme, indicating that head-tilting
(which they call external normalization) occurs when the cognitive demand of not tilting the head by means of “internal
normalization” increases (more cognitive effort to read more letters in tilted position, and more extreme tilt of the letters). Thus,
when internal computational demand increases, an externally
mediated cognitive strategy becomes more attractive. This was
also found in a study by Kirsh (2009), in which participants
played a mental tic-tac-toe game with the experimenter. During the mental tic-tac-toe game participants have to keep their
own “moves” and those of the opponent, in mind. In the critical conditions, participants were given a sheet of paper with a
tic-tac-toe matrix depicted on it or a blank sheet. External support of a tic-tac-toe matrix aided participants’ efﬁciency of playing
the game in comparison to having no support or a white sheet.
Apparently, participants are able to project the progression of
the moves on the matrix through visual simulation. This is very
similar to chess-players who think through moves on a chessboard without manipulating the board (Kirsh, 2009). Interestingly,
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however, the external support was only beneﬁcial when the tictac-toe game was complex (4 × 4 matrix as opposed to a 3 × 3
matrix), and especially for participants who scored low on spatial ability. Thus, this study suggests that projection on external
support is especially helpful when cognitive demand is high, and
relatedly, primarily for those who are low in spatial cognitive
ability.
As a ﬁnal example, the study conducted by Martin and Schwartz
(2005) shows how active manipulation of the environment may
foster learning through exploration of the solution space. In two
studies, children (9–10 years old) were learning how to solve fraction operator problems (e.g., one-fourth of eight candies), using
physical tiles and pie-wedges that were movable and in another
set of trials, using line drawings of pies or tiles which they could
highlight and circle with a pen. The difﬁculty that children often
experience in this task is that they focus on the numerator, leading them to understand “one-fourth of eight candies” to be “one
candy.” Martin and Schwartz (2005) predicted that physical interaction with manipulable objects would increase the chance that
children come to interpret that one-fourth of eight means four
groups of two because rearranging the tiles results in new groupings. Thus they reasoned that the agent and the environment
mutually adapt each other (as in the case of drawing), where one
acts without a preconceived goal on the environment which in
turn feeds back information that might align with the correct solution. Indeed, children performed better with manipulable objects
than without them (Experiments 1 and 2). Interestingly, presenting the children with the correct organization of tiles did not aid
understanding; rather the physical open-ended interaction with
the environment drove understanding and performance on the
task (see also Manches et al., 2010).
Let us summarize. First, the cognitive system makes use of
the environment to distribute computational load but also to
enable exploration of a problem-space that is difﬁcult to achieve
off-line (i.e., to achieve through purely internal computations).
Moreover, the cognitive system is not a priori driven to reduce
internal computational load by off-loading onto the environment,
rather the environment is exploited if it offers a cheaper resource
than internal means of computation to achieve an acceptable
performance on a task (Gray and Fu, 2004). Although not conclusive, it further seems that when cognitive demand is high,
either due to external constraints (higher cognitive load of the
task) or internal constraints (e.g., low visuospatial cognitive ability) the cognitive system is more likely to opt for and beneﬁt
from external computational strategies. However, these ﬁndings
do not allow us to draw deﬁnitive conclusions about when and
how the cognitive system trades external with internal computational resources. Thus one of the major challenges for research in
embedded/extended cognition is to determine which external (e.g.,
availability of external information) and internal (e.g., working
memory ability) constraints affect whether and how problemsolving strategies become externally or internally mediated (Risko
et al., 2013). Furthermore, is it possible to identify a trajectory
of problem-solving strategies as expertise develops? Speciﬁcally,
does the cognitive system ﬁrst rely on external support – given
that it is still ill-equipped to perform stand-alone internal computations – and are computations increasingly performed off-line
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when the cognitive system becomes more equipped (e.g., because
of acquired strategy knowledge or chunking mechanisms) to hold
task-relevant information internally?
Even though such questions cannot yet be answered by the
embedded/extended cognition frameworks, it is not difﬁcult to
see the relevance of this framework for gesture research; there is a
clear analogy between these ﬁndings and the ﬁndings from some of
the gesture studies reviewed in the section on “the intra-cognitive
role of gestures.”
AN EMBEDDED/EXTENDED PERSPECTIVE ON THE COGNITIVE
FUNCTION OF GESTURES

Recently, Clark (2008, 2013; see also Wheeler, 2013) provided a
purely extended perspective on gesticulation. Clark (2013) provides a detailed discussion of why gestures should be seen as
constitutive to – as opposed to merely causally impinging on – cognitive processes (cf. Wheeler, 2013). Here we only brieﬂy address
his account to further develop an embedded/extended perspective
that is able to provide an explanation of the empirical data on the
cognitive function of gestures as well as produce hypotheses and
identify challenges for further research.
According to Clark (2013) we should not understand the cognitive role of gestures purely in terms of its neural pre- and
post-cursors:
“The wrong image here is that of a central reasoning engine that merely
uses gesture to clothe or materialize performed ideas. Instead, gesture
and overt or covert speech emerge as interacting parts of a distributed
cognitive engine, participating in cognitively potent self-stimulating
loops whose activity is as much an aspect of our thinking as its result.”
(p. 263)

Furthermore, he states that:
“The physical act of gesturing is part and parcel of a coupled neuralbodily unfolding that is itself usefully seen as an extended process of
thought.” (p. 257)

Clark further argues that by producing a gesture, something
concrete is brought into being (arm posture) that subsequently
affects ongoing thinking and reasoning. Much like using a notepad,
gestures provide a stable physical presence that embodies a particular aspect of a cognitive task. We can appreciate Clark’s point if
we consider that speech dissolves in midair and working memory
allows only for a certain amount of thoughts to be consciously
entertained. We can argue that gestures are not only a way to
externalize speech and thought content, but also allow for temporal cognitive stability that might be more reliable than internal
means of temporal cognitive extension (e.g., consciously attending
to a thought to keep in mind).
Thus the key to an embedded/extended perspective on gestures
is the view that gestures fulﬁll a cognitive function because they are
bodily. That is, in contrast to what the GSA and the IPH propose,
gesticulation produces an external physical presence that somehow
supports internal cognitive processes. According to Clark’s (2013)
purely extended account, this physical presence instantiated in gesture is actually part of thinking itself. Indeed, he thinks that a more
moderate account of gestures’ function in which they merely affect
inner neural cognitive processes is misconstrued. His argument
for an extended cognitive understanding of gestures relies on the
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appreciation that some crucial forms of neural activity arise in
coordination with gestures, wherein gesture and neural activity
are interdependent in achieving a particular cognitive state. Thus
although, in some instances “‘neural goings-on’ may be sufﬁcient
for the presence of some cognitive state or the other” in other
instances gestures, at times, should be given a genuine cognitive
status (p. 261) because “gesture and speech emerge as interacting parts of a cognitive system” (p. 263) whereby no meaningful
categorization can be made of what should be considered cognitive or non-cognitive on the basis of the distinction between inner
(neural activity) and outer (gestures).
How and when do these speciﬁc physical conditions fulﬁll a
supporting role for a particular cognitive function? It is instructive
to compare the research from the embedded/extended cognition
tradition with research on the cognitive function of gesture. We
need to reconsider the research by Kirsh and Maglio (1994), which
showed that expert Tetris players operate on the environment to
alleviate internal computational load (epistemic actions). Determining where a zoid ﬁts is not dependent on internally computed
rotations of the zoid, but is achieved by actual rotation of the
zoid. In mental rotation tasks in which participants have to judge
whether a 3-d zoid matches one out of several 3-d zoids depicted
in different rotational angles (classic S–M cube task; Shepard and
Metzler, 1971), participants use gestures to aid in their judgments
(Chu and Kita, 2008, 2011). We would submit, that gestures in this
case are epistemic actions that reveal information that is hidden
(since the 3-d zoids do not rotate by themselves) and difﬁcult or
more costly to compute internally. Chu and Kita (2008) also found
that when participants ﬁrst approach the mental rotation task they
are more likely to use hand-movements as-if actively rotating the
block. We would speculate that in this case gestures fulﬁll the function of providing a physical platform that supports the internal
representational stability (a term earlier used by Hutchins, 2005) of
a rotating 3-d zoid (see also Pouw et al., 2014). In this case the zoid
is visually “projected” into the hands (Kirsh, 2009) and is manipulated as if it were actually in the hand. In this case the hands offer
a reliable external support for performing the cognitive function
of rotating the projected 3-d zoid through gestures. Furthermore,
using pointing gestures to keep track of something in the environment similarly produces a reliable physical attentional marker that
alleviates internal attentional tracking processes (e.g., Kirsh, 1995;
Delgado et al., 2011). This might also be the case with abacus users
doing mental calculations that perform gestures on, what seems to
be, a mentally projected abacus (Hatano et al., 1977; Hatano and
Osawa, 1983). In this case, physical gesticulation seems to be preferred by these users as opposed to internally simulating changes
on the abacus. We would argue that because gestures allow a stable
external physical presence, they support internal representational
stability of the dynamically changing abacus during calculation.
In line with Kirsh (2009), we argue that in these cases the cognitive system seems to be neither purely off-line nor on-line; rather,
it uses partly environmental resources (e.g., gestures) and internal cognitive resources (e.g., visual simulation) to perform a task.
Gestures are essentially a way to put on-line extra-neural resources
into the mix of problem-solving resources.
Another possible embedded/extended function of gesture is
exploration of a problem space. Martin and Schwartz (2005) found
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that manipulation of objects promoted the understanding of
fraction-operating principles. Relevantly, gesturing might sometimes allow the gesturer to become aware of structural correlations
that would be difﬁcult to generate through internal computation. For instance, this seemed to be the case in the rotating-gear
problem, in which the number gestures used that simulated each
rotation of a gear predicted the discovery of a more efﬁcient
problem-solving strategy that involved pick-up of the regularity
that each gear N + 2 rotates in the same direction (Delgado et al.,
2011).
With regard to when gestures emerge to fulﬁll an embedded/extended function, the research that we have discussed in
the domain of embedded/extended cognition has another interesting alignment with the gesture literature. We can summarize
both streams of ﬁndings in one converging main principle: When
the costs of internal computation are high, either induced by external
constraints (higher cognitive demand of the task; more cost of retrieving information from the environment) or internal constraints (e.g.,
lower working memory ability) the cognitive system is more likely to
adopt, if cheaply available, an externally supported problem-solving
strategy; be it the environment or gestures (Goldin-Meadow et al.,
2001; Gray and Fu, 2004; Wagner et al., 2004; Kirsh, 2009; Ping
and Goldin-Meadow, 2010; Marstaller and Burianová, 2013; Risko
et al., 2013; Smithson and Nicoladis, 2014). In other words, “cognitive processes ﬂow to wherever it is cheaper to perform them”
(Kirsh, 2010, p. 442). Understood in this manner, it is not surprising that people who are describing a physical object tend to gesture
less when the object is present as opposed to absent (Morsella
and Krauss, 2004), since the task-relevant information is cheaply
available in the environment. Or that gestures are more likely to
be used to lighten the cognitive load when pressure is put on
internal computational system (cognitive demand of the task; e.g.,
Goldin-Meadow et al., 2001; Smithson and Nicoladis, 2014).
This embedded/extended perspective on the cognitive function of gestures, leads to several testable questions and further
challenges for future research.
First, an interesting avenue for further research is to determine
how changes in the external constraints – such as the cognitive
demands of a task – and in the ease of availability of external
resources, changes the likelihood of gesturing. For example, one
could devise a mental rotation task in which participants can rotate
a 3-d zoid either through a mouse, by using gestures, or solely
by internal strategies. According to the present perspective, if we
manipulate the speed in which the 3-d zoid can be manipulated
by a mouse, we would predict that participants are more likely to
use gestures when the manipulation takes more time (as relative
cost decreases). Another, more unorthodox manipulation would
be to put varying weights on the wrists of participants, which may
induce costs in terms of energy expense, leading participants to
an earlier adoption of an internal solution strategy. Many more
constraints could be considered to assess the trade-off decision
between internal and external resources that the cognitive system
seems to make.
Second, gesture use evolves (Chu and Kita, 2008). When the
task is more familiar, hand-gestures evolve from “as-if manipulations” to a stand-in-for relation of the 3-d zoid by means of
a rotating ﬂat hand, eventually eliminating the use of gestures
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altogether. In a similar vein, when abacus users become more
advanced they tend to use less and less gestures during mental calculations. Indeed, it seems that gestures itself are costly to perform,
and contrary to the GSA account, may under certain circumstances
hinder performance (De Nooijer et al., in press), or learning (Post
et al., 2013) relative to other strategies. Interesting in this regard,
is research that suggests that different types of body-movements
have their own cognitive load (or come with particular cognitive
costs) and may at times be traded for less costly bodily movements. That is dancers who rehearsed a dance-routine performed
better when they rehearsed through “marking” (minimal movements and use of gestures to stand in for full-out movements)
as opposed to rehearsing the routine full out (Warburton et al.,
2013). Thus, it seems that under certain conditions, gestures, once
cheap resources to think with, become relatively costly in comparison to, and are therefore traded in for, purely internal strategies.
This raises several questions. For example, do gestures help in the
internalization process? Thus, are embedded/extended solution
strategies shaping the way internal computations are performed?
Relatedly, when the cognitive system has a lower ability to
produce internal object rotations (i.e., low spatial cognitive ability) it will rely more on external resources such as gestures (e.g.,
Chu et al., 2013; Marstaller and Burianová, 2013). An important
research question that relates to this idea is whether people who
score “low” on spatial cognitive ability test are actually only scoring
low on mental spatial cognitive ability, and may not underperform
when gestures are allowed. Indeed, when gesture is prohibited people who are low in working memory perform only more poorly
on a mental rotation task with no performance deﬁcits in the gesture condition, suggesting that they can fully compensate with
external problem-solving strategies (Marstaller and Burianová,
2013). Furthermore, consider ﬁndings that prohibiting gesturing has a negative effect on performance. Seen in this light, this
negative effect of not gesturing may not arise because it imposes
cognitive load, and thereby imposes constraints on cognition (as
proposed by the GSA account), but precisely because the prohibition to gesture withholds the cognitive system from the use of
external resources in the performance of a task. Thus, whereas
the GSA account suggests that not-gesturing imposes a cognitive load since the agent has to prevent automatic activations of
gestures, we propose that the prohibition of gesturing takes external bodily resources away from the agent and drives the agent to
rely exclusively on internal computational processes. This is an
important empirical question that future research should address,
as it is both related to how we should deﬁne and measure cognitive abilities, as well as to the particular cognitive function of
gestures.
A more fundamental question that currently remains unanswered in the embedded/extended perspective on gesturing is
what type of information is being made available through gesturing. Is it the proprioceptive, kinesthetic, haptic, and/or visual
consequences of movement that allow gestures to support cognitive processes? Or both, as these systems are tightly coupled
(e.g., Radman, 2013)? For example, it is well-known that the
visually impaired people use gestures (Iverson, 1998). Do they
still beneﬁt from gestures through proprioception or other consequences of movement? Clark (2013) raised a similar question
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in relation to patients with a rare disease that leads to loss
of proprioception; yet these patients are still able to gesture
quite naturally (see Gallagher, 2005).Would gestures still fulﬁll an
embedded/extended cognitive function for such patients through
visual feedback? This question is somewhat harder to address since
the disease is, luckily, quite rare. An interesting avenue for research
therefore would be to interfere with the information that gestures might provide as to identify factors that might underlie the
embedded/extended cognitive function of gestures. For example,
obstructing visibility of one’s own gestures, by putting a screen
at the level of the shoulders (Gallagher, 2005). Thus the current challenge for the present account is to provide an account
of what information gestures produce that might be supportive
for cognitive processes.

CONCLUSION
By means of our review of the empirical literature we have tried
to assess explanatory power of current theories with regard to
the question of how gestures might fulﬁll cognitive functions.
Although all the accounts we have addressed here claim that
gestures indeed fulﬁll a cognitive function, we have shown that
in these accounts, this claim often does not refer to gestures,
but rather to their neural precursors. Importantly, there are
accounts that suggest that gestures fulﬁll the cognitive role of
priming or activating internal action representations (e.g., Krauss
et al., 2000; Goldin-Meadow and Beilock, 2010), yet we think
the reason why bodily movements fulﬁll this function is not
clearly stated and seems to differ from the embedded/extended
cognitive function we have identiﬁed here. We have tried to
analyze the cognitive functions of gestures, by integrating the
literature of embedded/extended cognition with the gesture literature. There is a considerable amount of overlap between the
ways cognizers have been found to use their environment as
well as how gestures support cognitive processes. Although further research into the exact mechanisms of embedded/extended
functions of gestures is necessary, we put forth the notion that
gestures provide the cognitive system with a stable external, physical, and visual presence that can provide a means to think
with.
Importantly, we should stress two related concerns that apply
to the current proposal. First, it is evident that the embedded/extended view on gestures, as presented here, does not
address the full gamut of gesticulation. We have primarily focused
on co-thought gestures in problem-solving contexts instead of,
for example, beat gestures, or gestures that primarily emerge
in communicative contexts. Therefore, at this point we remain
agnostic to whether all gestures fulﬁll an embedded/extended cognitive function (for the gesturer). Indeed, extant “alternative”
theories that we have addressed here may very well be complementary to our proposal. These theories are complementary
to our proposal in that they might address cognitive functions and underpinnings of gestures that we have not addressed
here. For example, it is possible that gestures emerge from
action-related motor simulations that are activated during visuospatial cognition (Hostetter and Alibali, 2008) with the added
proposal that the bodily externalizations of these motor simulations have a cognitive function themselves of the kind we have
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proposed here. Thus although we maintain that current theories in the gesture literature are not very suitable to address why
gestures-as-bodily-acts might fulﬁll a cognitive function, our proposal does not deny any explanatory power of these theories
regarding other aspects of the nature and cognitive function of
gestures.
Secondly, it is clear that gestures have a developmental trajectory and primarily emerge in intersubjective contexts (e.g.,
McNeill, 1992; Iverson and Thelen, 1999; Tomasello, 2008;
Liszkowski et al., 2012). As such, the current embedded/extended
account of the cognitive function of gestures is still presented in an
“ontogenetic vacuum” and is still rather individualistic. Although
this is a concern that needs to be addressed in future work, there is
much room for exploring how the embedded/extended function
of gestures might be related to developmental and social dimensions. For example, Iverson and Thelen (1999) have provided a
detailed account of how the hands, mouth, and the brain should
be regarded as one dynamical system; more speciﬁcally of how
these components become entrained throughout development.
Although they focus primarily on the way language and gesture
become constitutively interdependent, the kind of gestures that
have been the focus of this paper (gestures in problem-solving
contexts) can be scaffolded onto their developmental account as
another way of how “perception, action, and cognition can be
mutually and ﬂexibly coupled” (Iverson and Thelen, 1999, p. 37).
On the other hand, how does our account relate to the intersubjective context in which gestures most often emerge? It would
fare well with appeals coming from embodied cognitive science
which suggest that an important way humans achieve interpersonal understanding is not from a spectatorial third-person stance,
but rather from an interactive and second-person stance (e.g., De
Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007; De Jaegher et al., 2010; Anderson et al.,
2012; Schilbach et al., 2013; Pouw et al., under review). In these
approaches interpersonal understanding involves “know-how that
allows us to sustain interactions, form relations, understand each
other, and act together” (De Jaegher et al., 2010, p. 442), instead of
two brains trying to predict each other’s mental contents through
observation alone. In such a portrayal of intersubjectivity, gestures
are always already considered as having an embedded function
for both the gesturer and the interlocutor since gestures are coconstitutive of the social coordination itself. To put it another
way, in social interaction gestures are a non-neural component
that is part of an organism–organism–environment coordinative structure (Anderson et al., 2012). The challenge for further
work is to show how non-social embedded/extended gestures
that we have focused on here might develop from these social
contexts.
In closing, our aim with this article to point out the necessity
of understanding the role of the body in thinking. We tried to
accomplish this by developing an embedded/extended perspective
on the cognitive role of gestures. In this perspective, the body is not
a trivial output-appendage of the cognitive system but an important component thereof. The body is a resource with particular
qualities that is recruited in the coordination of cognitive processes. This perspective intended to promote research that tries to
further address when, why, and how gestures are recruited during
cognitive processes.
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